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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
* * * 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State hereby submits 
this brief in reply to appellee's brief. 
ARGUMENT 
In his opposing brief, defendant contends that the search warrant was overbroad and 
that the facts in the affidavit were insufficient to enable the magistrate to assess probable 
cause. Aple. Brf. at 6-31. He also contends that the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule did not apply, and that in any case, a good faith exception should not be recognized 
under Utah's exclusionary rule. Aple. Brf. at 32-41. Because the State adequately addressed 




THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT OVERBROAD 
A. THE SEARCH WARRANT SATISFIED THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S PARTICULARITY 
REQUIREMENT. 
Defendant first contends that the warrant was overbroad because it did not describe 
the things to be seized with sufficient particularity, thus "leav[ing] to the officer's discretion 
what should and should not be seized." Aple. Brf. at 7-15. Defendant's contention is 
without merit. 
"A sufficiently particular warrant 'allows the searcher to reasonably ascertain and 
identify the things authorized to be seized,' leaving 'nothing to the officer's discretion as to 
what is to be seized, so that the officer is prevented from generally rummaging through a 
person's belongings.'" United States v. Guidry, 199 F.3d 1150, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999) 
{quoting United States v. Hargus, 128 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 523 
U.S. 1079, 118 S.Ct. 1526 (1998)). As explained in the State's opening brief, Aplt. Brf. at 
30-31, the search warrant met that requirement, authorizing the seizure of only those 
"[d]ocuments relating to the business activities of [defendant] . . . operating as Maxtron 
Corp. (formerly Alta Publishing), Santos International, and United Investors Credit Services, 
Inc." R. 289-90 (emphasis added, all caps eliminated). 
Although the warrant was unquestionably broad in scope, it was not a general warrant 
as defendant contends because it gave the searching officers no discretion to determine what 
items would be seized, nor did it leave the door open for officers to seize other business 
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documents or personal items as defendant suggests. See Aple. Brf. at 14. Although the 
affidavit established that defendant operated other businesses from his West Valley office, 
see R. 273:1f2l(e), the warrant only authorized the seizure of records relating to the three 
"Pennsylvania" businesses or their predecessor. The searching officers had no authority to 
pick and choose. See Worthington v. United States, 726 F.2d 1089, 1095 (6th Cir.) (Contie, 
Circuit Judge, concurring), cert denied, 469 U.S. 827, 105 S.Ct. 109 (1984); United States 
v. Christine, 687 F.2d 749, 753 (3rd Cir. 1982). On this point, the trial court agreed. See R. 
298. The warrant, therefore, did not authorize a "general, exploratory rummaging" of 
defendant's belongings in the hope of finding evidence of some unspecified crime—the evil 
which the Fourth Amendment' s particularity requirement was designed to prevent. Coolidge 
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467, 91 S.Ct 2022, 2038-39 (1971). 
B. THE AFFIDAVIT'S PROBABLE CAUSE SHOWING SUPPORTED THE SCOPE OF THE 
WARRANT. 
Defendant also argues that the warrant was overbroad because it authorized the search 
of more than what was justified by the affidavit's probable cause showing, contending that 
it should have been limited to particular transactions. Aple. Brf. at 9, 11-12. Clearly, a 
warrant will be overbroad if its scope exceeds the probable cause to support it. United States 
v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 605 (10th Cir. 1992). However, as fully explained in the State's 
opening brief, the probable cause showing of defendant's pervasive fraudulent scheme 
justified the breadth of the warrant under the "permeated-with-fraud" doctrine. See Aplt. 
Brf. at 18-29. Where, as here, the affidavit "allege[d] a series and pattern of illegal acts," it 
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"supports an inference of the probability" of fraudulent acts "beyond those specifically 
enumerated." See United States v. Searle, 804 F.Supp. 1437, 1440 (D. Utah 1992) 
(permitting the seizure of all firearms records and firearms in a pawn shop). 
1. Seizure of Computer. 
Defendant contends that the seizure of the computer was not justified. Aple. Brf. at 
14. However, Ms. DeHerrera represented that defendant's correspondence, notices, and legal 
documents were prepared on the office computer and that these files were saved not only on 
the computer's hard drive, but also on disks and tapes stored in a safe at the office and in his 
home. R. 272, 274: f 21(a), (i). As such, the computer equipment as a whole was an 
instrumentality of the crime of communications fraud and within the proper scope of the 
warrant and the affidavit supporting it. See Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472,1481 (10th Cir. 
1997) (finding that "[t]he computer equipment as a whole was an instrumentality of the crime 
of distributing obscenity" and was thus properly "covered by the warrant"). Also, nothing 
suggests that personal items would be found in the office computer as argued by defendant. 
Cf. United States v. Campos, 221 F.3d 1143, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that home 
computer which included relevant documents intermingled with irrelevant documents could 
be held pending further approval by a magistrate of the conditions for further search). 
Moreover, the affiant explained in the affidavit that seizure of the computer equipment was 
required "so that a qualified computer expert can conduct a thorough, complete and accurate 
examination of the evidence in a laboratory or other controlled environment." R. 271: f23. 
In this way, only relevant information would be seized. 
4 
2. Overbreadth Analysis Under the Utah Constitution. 
Defendant also contends that even if the warrant is not overbroad under the Fourth 
Amendment, "it could still be over broad under the broader protection of Article I, Section 
14, of the Utah Constitution." Aple. Brf. at 15-16. Because defendant does not engage in 
any substantive analysis explaining why the Utah Constitution provides broader protections 
under these circumstances, his claim does not warrant a separate constitutional analysis. See 
State v. Real Property at 633 East 640 North, Orern, Utah, 2000 UT 17, f5, 994 P.2d 1254 
(refusing to consider appellant's state constitutional claim because she "fail[ed] to support 
her state constitutional arguments with any substantive analysis"), cert, denied, 530 U.S. 
1262, 120 S.Ct. 2718 (2000); State v. Davis, 972 P.2d 388, 392 (Utah 1998) (refusing to 
consider separate constitutional claim because defendant "did not adequately set forth any 
separate legal analysis or otherwise suggest a reason that warranted distinct analytical 
treatment under the Utah Constitution"). 
II. 
THE SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT PROVIDED FACTS FROM WHICH 
THE MAGISTRATE COULD MAKE A PROBABLE CAUSE 
DETERMINATION 
Defendant also contends that the affidavit in support of the warrant did not include facts 
upon which the magistrate could make a probable cause determination. Aple. Brf. at 17-26. 
Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
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A. THE GATES "TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST. 
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (1983), the Supreme Court 
articulated the appropriate standard in assessing the sufficiency of a search warrant affidavit. 
"The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision 
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the 
'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair 
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." 
Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332; accord State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1259-60 
(Utah 1993). This Court's duty "is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial 
basis for . . . concluding]' that probable cause existed." Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 
S.Ct. at 2332 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,271, 80 S.Ct. 725, 736 (I960)); 
accord Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1259-60. 
In adopting the "totality of the circumstances" test, the Supreme Court rejected the 
rigid, two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test which independently assessed and placed undue 
emphasis on (1) the veracity or reliability of the informants supplying the information, and 
(2) the basis of the informants' knowledge. Gates, 462 U.S. at 233,103 S.Ct. at 2329.1 As 
observed by this Court, those elements "are not strict, independent requirements to be 'rigidly 
exacted' in every case," but "are nonexclusive elements to be evaluated in reaching the 
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances, there is a fair 
lThe Aguilar-Spinelli test arose from two Supreme Court decisions rendered in the 
1960fs: Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509 (1964), and Spinelli v. United 
States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584 (1969). 
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probability that the contraband [or evidence of crime] will be found in the place described/' 
State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 130 (Utah misquoting and citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 230, 
238, 103 S.Ct. at 2328, 2332) (footnotes omitted). 
B. THE FACTS SUPPLIED BY THE CONTRACTORS AND FORMER EMPLOYEES 
ENABLED THE MAGISTRATE TO ASSESS PROBABLE CAUSE. 
Although defendant acknowledges that a supporting affidavit is reviewed under the 
Gates "totality of the circumstances" test, he in fact applies the rigid Aguilar-Spinelli test, 
engaging in the "excessively technical dissection" of each averment in the affidavit "with 
undue attention being focused on isolated issues that cannot sensibly be divorced from the 
other facts presented to the magistrate." Gates, 462 U.S. at 234-35, 103 S.Ct. at 2330. A 
review of the entire affidavit reveals that it included more than sufficient information to 
enable the magistrate to make a probable cause determination. 
Defendant dismisses the first five paragraphs as irrelevant. Aple. Brf. at 17-18. Yet, 
as further explained below, paragraphs 1,2, and 4 identified the sources of the information 
contained in the affidavit. Paragraphs 3 and 5, together with paragraphs 6,9, and 24, set out 
the ultimate conclusions of the affiant and the scope of the requested search—that defendant 
is perpetrating a fraudulent scheme through three "Pennsylvania" businesses and that 
evidence of the specified crimes will be found at his West Valley office and his home. See 
R. 267-71,283-85. Tjfthe affidavit were confined to these paragraphs, it would doubtless be 
insufficient to support the search warrant. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 109, 84 S.Ct. at 1511. 
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However, it included much more. Additionally, those allegations served to identify the 
places to be searched, the items sought, and the crimes alleged. 
The balance of the affidavit included more than bald conclusions, but provided 
detailed information upon which the magistrate could judge for herself whether there was 
probable cause for the warrant. As discussed in the State's opening brief, Aplt. Brf. at 23-26, 
the affidavit describes in specific detail the fraudulent and pervasive scheme perpetrated by 
defendant. Defendant contends, however, that the magistrate had no way to judge for herself 
the reliability of these statements because the affidavit does not reveal the source of the 
information and the basis of that knowledge. In so alleging, defendant fails to read the 
affidavit in a practical, common-sense way, judging each individual averment independently 
as if it were suspended in a vacuum. 
Although each paragraph does not expressly state who provided the affiant with the 
information, the source of that information is made clear in the first four paragraphs of the 
affidavit. The magistrate learns that investigators from the Attorney General's Office, the 
Division of Consumer Protection, and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service interviewed at least 
seven contractors (Barkdull Plumbing, Colonial Building Supply, Anderson Lumber, Charles 
Cole Mast, R&R Drywall, A-Quality Plumbing & Heating, and Steve Peterson Interiors), two 
others associated with the construction industry (Mountain Fuel Supply and Foote Insurance 
Agency), and two former employees (Karen Noland and Suzanne DeHerrera). In paragraph 
14, the affiant also expressly states that "based upon [his] interviews and [his] review of 
interviews conducted by [the other investigators]," he learned that defendant routinely stalls 
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clients into default through various misrepresentations. R. 281:f 14. The ensuing paragraphs 
describe in detail those misrepresentations, and although they do not expressly credit the 
interviews as the source of that information, that fact is apparent from the context of the 
affidavit. 
Moreover, the detail of the information itself speaks for its reliability. The affidavit 
even meets the benchmark set by the Supreme Court in Spinelli—whose rigid and impractical 
test has since been rejected. The Spinelli court held: 
The detail provided by the informant in Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 
79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959), provides a suitable benchmark. While 
Hereford, the Government's informer in that case did not state the way in 
which he had obtained his information, he reported that Draper had gone to 
Chicago the day before by train and that he would return to Denver by train 
with three ounces of heroin on one of two specified mornings. Moreover, 
Hereford went on to describe, with minute particularity, the clothes that Draper 
would be wearing upon his arrival at the Denver station. A magistrate, when 
confronted with such detail, could reasonably infer that the informant had 
gained his information in a reliable way. 
Spinelli, 393 U.S. at 416-17,89 S.Ct. at 589. Thus, when the magistrate here was confronted 
with a thorough description of the scheme, she could "reasonably infer that the informant[s] 
gained [their] information in a reliable way." Id. 
In addition, much of the information described in the paragraphs that do not expressly 
identify a source is corroborated by the information obtained from the promissory notes and 
the interviews with defendant's former employees. Compare, e.g., R. 279-82: ff 11,16-17, 
19 with R. 276-77: f20(f), (g), (j)andR. 281-82: f t 12-13. Defendant,however, complains 
that the affidavit did not fully explain in each instance how his two former employees came 
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to know what they alleged. Aple. Brf. at 23-25. However, the "totality of the circumstances" 
test does not require an "elaborate exegeses of an informant's tip," nor does it require "'that 
each factual allegation which the affiant puts forth must be independently documented, or 
that each and every fact which contributed to his conclusions be spelled out in the 
complaint/" Gates, 462 U.S. at 231 n.6, 103 S.Ct. at 2328 n.6 (quoting Jaben v. United 
States, 381 U.S. 214,224-25, 85 S.Ct. 1365,1371 (1965)). Instead, the test simply requires 
that enough information be presented to the magistrate to enable her to make the judgment 
that probable cause exists justifying a search. Id. That was done here. 
Noland worked for defendant for six months, during which time defendant began 
operating through the "Pennsylvania" companies. R. 276-77,279: f f 20,20(g). As the office 
manager for six months, Noland displayed an intimate knowledge of defendant's business 
practices, and even his financial obligations to out-of-state attorneys. She prepared legal 
documents, played a central role in collections, and even put together phony brochures to be 
used as evidence in Florida courts. See R. 275-79: f 20. About seven months after Noland 
ceased working for defendant, DeHerrera began working for him—some four months before 
the warrant was executed. R. 275: f 21. Like Noland, DeHerrera also exhibited an intimate 
knowledge of the business. She prepared collection letters, notices, and legal documents on 
the office computer. R. 274: [^21 (a). She sent mail addressed to Utah sub-contractors in bulk 
to Pennsylvania where it was then mailed individually from Pennsylvania post offices. R. 
274: Tf21 (d). She also displayed an obvious familiarity with the structure of the business, the 
roles of the various players, and where the records and assets of the business were kept. R. 
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271-75: | 21 . In short, "[t]he circumstances as a whole adequately indicate that [the 
information provided] was truthful" and that it was not based on "some remote hearsay or 
assumption based on circumstantial events." Hansen, 732 P.2d at 130.2 
Moreover, unlike the unnamed informants in Aguilar, Spinelli, and Gates, the 
informants relied upon in the affidavit here were not unidentified persons, but former 
employees and known contractors and others who had dealt with defendant. As observed by 
the Supreme Court in Gates, "if an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a 
report of criminal activity—which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability—[the 
Court] ha[s] found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary." Gates, 462 
U.S. at 233-34, 103 S.Ct. at 2330. The contractors and others relied on fall within this 
category of informants. The magistrate had no cause to question their information, especially 
in light of the further information provided by the former employees. As explained above, 
even if the magistrate were to entertain some doubt as to their motives, the detailed 
description they provided of defendant's modus operandi entitles their information to greater 
weight. See id. 
2Defendant argues that the magistrate should not have considered the information 
from the two former employees because it allegedly came from their testimony in a 
proceeding the record of which was presumably expunged. Aple. Brf. at 31-32. That 
argument is frivolous. Defendant has cited to nothing in the record that substantiates his 
claim that the investigators relied on an expunged record. To the contrary, the affidavit 
represents that the information from these witnesses came from interviews with the 
investigators. R. 275: f21; R. 279: f20. Moreover, expungement seals or destroys "a 
criminal record, including records of the investigation, arrest, detention, or conviction" of 
the person in a particular proceeding. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-9(5) (1999) (emphasis 
added). It does not bar the use of information from witnesses in a separate criminal 
proceeding, even if they testified in a proceeding the record of which was later expunged. 
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C. THE INFORMATION IN THE AFFIDAVIT WAS NOT S T \ L E . 
Defendant also contends that the information in the affidavit was stale Aple Brf at 
29-31 On a claim that information is stale, "[t]he concern is whether so much time has 
passed that there is no longer probable cause to believe that the evidence is still at the 
targeted locale." Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1260. Therefore, the question is whether, "viewing 
the affidavit in its entirety and in a common sense fashion," the information is sufficient to 
establish a "fair probability" that the evidence will still be found at the specified location 
State v Decorso, 1999 UT 57, ^62, 993 P 2d 837, cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164, 120 S Ct. 
1181 (2000). In making this determination, the Court "must consider the nature of the 
evidence sought—i.e., whether such evidence was of the type likely to be kept for a long 
time," and "the nature of [the] area searched." Id. at ffl[62,64 The Court must also consider 
"whether the crime is a single instance or an ongoing pattern of protracted violations [and] 
whether the inherent nature of the scheme suggests that it is probably continuing." People 
v Russo, 487 N.W.2d 698, 707 (Mich. 1992). 
"The likelihood that the evidence sought is still in place is a function not 
simply of watch and calendar but of variables that do not punch a clock: the 
character of the crime (chance encounter in the night or regenerating 
conspiracy?), of the criminal (nomadic or entrenched?), of the thing to be 
seized (perishable and easily transferable or of enduring utility to its holder?), 
of the place to be searched (mere criminal forum of convenience or secure 
operational base?), etc. The observation of a half-smoked marijuana cigarette 
in an ashtray at a cocktail party may well be stale the day after the cleaning 
lady has been m; the observation of the burial of a corpse m a cellar may well 
not be stale three decades later. The hare and the tortoise do not disappear at 
the same rate of speed." 
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Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise on Fourth Amendment Law § 37(a), at 
341 (3d ed. 1996) (quotingAndresen v. State, 331 A.2d 78,106 (Md. App. 1975), affd, All 
U.S. 463, 96 S.Ct. 2737 (1976)); accord Russo, 487 N.W.2d at 707 (quoting Andresen 
passage as set forth in LaFave). 
An evaluation of the nature of the crime, the evidence to be seized, and the places to 
be searched discounts defendant's claim that the information was stale. As discussed above, 
the affidavit alleged facts demonstrating an ongoing scheme to defraud subcontractors and 
others. The affidavit showed that defendant was operating the scheme in 1995 and began 
operating it under the guise of the Pennsylvania businesses at the beginning of 1996. R. 276-
77: f 20(g) It further shows that he was still operating the scheme in November 1996 and 
beyond. R. 274-75: ^2\? Moreover, nothing signaled that defendant intended to cease 
operations in the near future. The business documents to be seized were of "continuing 
utility" to defendant. See Decorso, 1999 UT 57, at f 63. Indeed, the documents generated 
by defendant were essential to the continued viability of his scheme. Finally, the places to 
be searched—defendant's office and home—were not criminal forums of convenience, but 
established bases for defendant's operations, or in the case of his home, for preservation of 
records. 
3Contrary to defendant's claim, the affidavit does not indicate that Suzanne 
DeHerrera merely worked during the month of November, only that she was hired as a 
part-time secretary during that month. R. 275: \2\. While it is clear she ceased working 
for defendant sometime before the warrant was executed, based on the breadth of 
information provided, it is apparent she worked much longer than that single month. 
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Defendant further contends that the magistrate could not rely on the affiant's 
description of the promissory notes and advertising agreements because he did not specify 
when they were made. Aple. Brf. at 22. Once again, defendant fails to read the affidavit in 
a common-sense fashion, ignoring the context in which the information is provided. In State 
v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983), the affiant set forth facts establishing that the 
defendant was selling contraband, but did not identify the dates of those observations. The 
Court rejected the defendant's argument that omitting the dates of the observed transactions 
was fatal to the warrant. Id. at 1261. It held that a common-sense reading of the affidavit 
made it clear the criminal activities were "recent and contemporaneous." Id. The affidavit 
here, when viewed in its entirety and in a common-sense fashion, also makes clear that 
defendant was engaged in an ongoing, fraudulent operation, Thus, as in Anderton, "[t]he 
affidavit in the instant case, couched as it is in present-tense language which describes on-
going criminal activity, clearly refutes any contention that it was based upon stale 
information." Id. 
* * * 
In sum, "[r]ead as a whole, and in a commonsense [sic] way, the affidavit sets forth 
sufficient underlying circumstances to support the conclusions reached by the affiant and to 




A GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION SHOULD BE APPLIED 
TO UTAH'S EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
Finally, defendant urges this Court not to recognize a good faith exception, like that 
announced in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984), to Utah's 
exclusionary rule under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution. Aple. Brf. at 34-40. 
His argument primarily rests on nonspecific historical anecdotes describing early Mormon 
conflicts with federal authorities and a suggestion that this history compels rejection of the 
good faith exception. Although he mentions the repeated efforts made in drafting the 
original Utah Constitution, Aple. Brf. at 38, he includes no legislative history that would 
support his assertion that the drafters had a "heightened appreciation" for a person's privacy 
rights, at least any more so than our American forebears. Aple. Brf. at 38-40. Indeed, this 
country's very independence was spurred by abuses of British officers executing general 
warrants known as writs of assistance. See Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476,481-82,85 S.Ct. 
506, 509-10 (1965). This Court should therefore reject defendant's rationale and apply the 
good faith exception to Utah's exclusionary rule for the reasons articulated in the State's 
opening brief. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
trial court's order suppressing the evidence seized pursuant to the search warrant. 
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